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involving transgender people. It is only 
now, in the context of litigation, that 
officials of the State suggest otherwise.”
Respecting the question of the 
merits, the court’s analysis goes so far 
as to assume the Defendants are correct 
that rational basis applies and finds 
that, even if it did, the Act could not 
survive this level of review. Although 
not explicit, Judge Trauger’s reasoning 
here arguably harkens back to an earlier 
and lengthy portion of the opinion 
examining Plaintiffs’ submission of a 
declaration from an expert on gender 
identity, Dr. Shayne Sebold Taylor, M.D. 
On this score, Judge Trauger points 
to evidence from Dr. Taylor that the 
Act might create issues of the sort it 
claimed to be trying to address. For 
example, a literal reading of the Act’s 
required signage would seem to require 
a transgender man to use the women’s 
restroom and a transgender woman to 
use the men’s restroom and the opposite 
seems a goal, if only implicit, of the 
legislation. 
The court easily found for Plaintiffs 
on the other three prongs of the analysis. 
The opinion recites the oft-cited 
principle that “’[t]he loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even 
minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.” “The 
irreparable harm posed by the Act, 
however, does not end with the abstract 
question of constitutionality . . . the 
[P]laintiffs have presented evidence 
that they have strived to be welcoming 
spaces for communities that include 
transgender individuals and that the 
signage required by the Act would 
disrupt welcoming environments that 
they wish to provide. That harm would 
be real, and it is not a harm that could be 
simply remedied by some award at the 
end of litigation.”
As to the public interest, the court 
concludes that there is “ . . . a low 
likelihood that the injunctive relief 
would intrude on any power legitimately 
retained by the State of Tennessee.” The 
Defendants had complained that by 
enjoining the state from enforcing the 
Act it would suffer an irreparable injury 
because the Act was passed by duly 
elected representatives. Judge Trauger 
pointed out, however, that no harm 
was, in fact, being done in this regard 
because “[n]o legislature can enact a law 
it lacks the power to enact.”
In balancing the equities, the court “ 
. . . [had] little difficulty concluding the 
preliminary injunction should issue . . 
. ” because without it, Plaintiffs would 
be irreparably harmed and requiring 
Tennessee to “ . . . abide by the U.S. 
Constitution, sooner rather than later, 
vindicates the public interest in rule of 
law and the acceptance, by States, of 
constitutional government.”
The opinion concludes with the 
simple order that Defendants “take no 
actions to enforce” the Act.
Judge Trauger was appointed by 
President Bill Clinton. The ACLU 
appeared on Plaintiffs’ behalf by 
Emerson Sykes, Esq., Rose Sykes, Esq. 
Stella Yarbrough, Esq., and Thomas H. 
Castelli, Esq. ■
Matthew Goodwin is an associate at 
Brady Klein Weissman LLP in New 










By Arthur S. Leonard
U.S. District Judge Jane Magnus-
Stinson ruled in Kluge v. Brownsburg 
Community School Corporation, 2021 
WL 2915023, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129122 (S.D. Ind., July 12, 2021), that 
the Brownsburg (Indiana) Community 
School Corporation did not violate 
music teacher John Kluge’s statutory 
rights under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 when it effectively 
discharged him for his refusal to 
comply with the School’s requirement 
that he address transgender students 
by their preferred names and pronouns. 
Granting summary judgment in favor 
of the Corporation, the court rejected 
Kluge’s assertion that his proposal to 
address all students by last name without 
using pronouns was a reasonable 
accommodate to his religious beliefs 
that the Corporation was obligated to 
accept.
The judge had previously dismissed 
Kluge’s claims that the School violated 
his First Amendment rights of free 
exercise of religion and freedom 
of speech, but she had denied the 
School’s motion to dismiss his Title 
VII reasonable accommodation claim 
at that time. See Kluge v. Brownsburg 
Community School Corporation, 432 F. 
Supp. 3d 823 (S.D. Ind., Jan. 8, 2020).
Kluge began working as a music 
teacher and orchestra leader at 
Brownsburg High School in August 
2014, and by all accounts was a 
successful and effective teacher – at 
least until the issue of transgender 
names came up. In 2016, the U.S. 
Education Department sent a “Dear 
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Colleague” letter to public school 
officials advising them of the rights of 
transgender students under Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, 
including the right to be addressed 
by the students’ preferred first names 
and pronouns. This letter was sparked 
by Gavin Grimm’s lawsuit against 
Gloucester School District in Virginia, 
which had adopted a rule barring 
the transgender boy from using the 
boys’ restrooms at the high school. 
The Obama Administration granted a 
request by Grimm’s ACLU attorneys to 
notify the court of the Administration’s 
position on Grimm’s Title IX right and 
followed up with the “Dear Colleague” 
letter sent nationwide.
The Corporation came to grips with 
this issue in the spring of 2017, as some 
transgender students were expected to 
attend the high school. The Corporation 
used a database called PowerSchool 
to maintain student records. It 
implemented a “Name Policy” to take 
effect in May 2017, requiring all staff 
to address students by the name that 
appeared in the PowerSchool database. 
Under the policy, transgender students 
could change their first name in the 
database by presenting a letter from a 
parent and a letter from a health care 
professional concerning the need for 
a name change consistent with their 
gender identity. A change in gender 
marker and pronouns on the database 
could go along with the name change.
Kluge “identifies as a Christian and 
is a member of Clearnote Church, which 
is part of the Evangelical Presbytery,” 
wrote Judge Magnus-Stinson. As a 
“church elder,” he holds leadership 
positions in the church and is a worship 
group leader. “Mr. Kluge’s religious 
beliefs ‘are drawn from the Bible,’ and 
his ‘Christian faith governs the way he 
thinks about human nature, marriage, 
gender, sexuality, morality, politics, 
and social issues,’” Kluge stated in a 
document filed with the court. “Mr. 
Kluge believes that God created 
mankind as either male or female, 
that this gender is fixed in each person 
from the moment of conception, and 
that it cannot be changed, regardless 
of an individual’s feelings or desires.” 
Under his beliefs, he would be sinning 
if he encouraged a student’s gender 
dysphoria by calling them by a name 
inconsistent with their sex as identified 
at birth.
Kluge notified the high school 
principal that he could not comply with 
the Name Policy, and was told he had 
three options: comply, resign, or be 
discharged. He proposed a compromise: 
that the school accommodate his 
religious beliefs by allowing him to 
call all students by their last name 
and avoid using pronouns. The school 
authorities agreed to let him do this, 
but at the end of the fall semester, they 
told him it wasn’t working and although 
they would let him finish out the school 
year under that arrangement, he would 
be expected in future to comply with 
the policy or to resign. Kluge alleged 
that he was told that he could submit a 
conditional letter of resignation and it 
would not be acted upon until the end 
of the spring semester, but the letter 
that he submitted said nothing about 
it being conditional, and at the end of 
the semester, as he indicated continued 
unwillingness to comply with the Name 
Policy, his resignation was accepted. He 
contended that this was a constructive 
discharge.
Kluge claimed that he had been 
discharged for his religious beliefs and 
filed suit, claiming violations of the 1st 
Amendment (and analogous provisions 
of the Indiana Constitution) and Title 
VII and parallel state laws. 
Judge Magnus-Stinson granted 
the School’s motion to dismiss the 
constitutional claims in January 2020, 
finding that Kluge’s 1st Amendment 
rights of free exercise of religion and 
freedom of speech were not implicated 
in the case. The Name Policy, she found, 
was a neutral, generally applicable 
policy, and he had no constitutional 
right under the religious freedom clause 
to refuse to comply with it. Similarly, 
she found, the language he was 
required to use in addressing students 
was not protected political speech of a 
private citizen, but rather was speech 
incidental to performing his duties as a 
public school teacher, and thus subject 
to regulation by the School. She also 
rejected his argument that the Name 
Policy violated the Due Process Clause 
on grounds of vagueness, pointing out 
that he was not required to make any 
judgment or interpretations, but just to 
use the names and gender designation 
as they appeared in the Corporation’s 
database, as clearly specified by the 
policy. 
But Judge Magnus-Stinson found, 
based on the allegations Kluge made 
in his complaint, that he had stated 
a claim of religious discrimination 
(failure to accommodate) and 
retaliation under Title VII, so the case 
proceeded to discovery. After discovery 
was completed, the School moved 
for summary judgement, which was 
granted on July 12, 2021.
The question under Title VII was 
whether the accommodation that 
Kluge sought would impose an “undue 
hardship” on the School. The judge 
decided that it would. “Mr. Kluge’s 
religious opposition to transgenderism 
is directly at odds with BCSC’s policy of 
respect for transgender students, which 
is founded in supporting and affirming 
those students,” she wrote, finding that 
“the undisputed evidence in this case 
demonstrates that the last names only 
accommodation indeed resulted in 
undue hardship to BCSC as that term is 
defined by relevant authority.” 
Transgender students had filed 
declarations with the court showing 
that “Mr. Kluge’s use of last names 
only – assuming, only for the purposes 
of this Order, that Mr. Kluge strictly 
complied with the rules of the 
accommodation – made them feel 
targeted and uncomfortable.” One of 
the students stated that they “dreaded 
going to orchestra class and did not 
feel comfortable speaking to Mr. Kluge 
directly. Other students and teachers 
complained that Mr. Kluge’s behavior 
was insulting or offensive and made his 
classroom environment unwelcoming 
and uncomfortable.” One transgender 
student “quit the orchestra entirely.” 
According to news reports (but not 
the judge’s opinion), students also 
complained that Kluge occasionally 
slipped up and misgendered trans 
students by using “Mr.” or “Ms.” to 
address them.
Thus, the court found, “this evidence 
shows that Mr. Kluge’s use of the last 
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names only accommodation burdened 
BSCS’s ability to provide an education 
to all students and conflicted with 
its philosophy of creating a safe 
and supportive environment for all 
students.” The court also noted the 
possibility that allowing Kluge to 
continue with this “accommodation” 
might subject the School to liability to 
the transgender students under Title IX, 
an issued which came into even clearer 
focus after the Biden Administration 
began in January 2021 by revoking the 
Trump Administration’s position that 
Title IX does not protect transgender 
students, and then issuing a formal 
interpretation applying the Supreme 
Court’s Bostock decision to the 
interpretation of Title IX, as several 
federal courts had done during 2020 
despite the Trump Administration’s 
position to the contrary. In addition, the 
7th Circuit was the first federal appeals 
court to recognize a transgender high 
school student’s right to use facilities 
consistent with their gender identity 
under Title IX, so the application 
of that statute to a gender identity 
discrimination claim is a binding 
precedent on the Indiana district court.
The judge also rejected Kluge’s 
retaliation claim, finding that because 
his refusal to comply with the Name 
Policy was not a “protected activity” 
under Title VII, the School’s discharge 
of Kluge for his opposition to the policy 
could not be the basis for a retaliation 
claim.
Judge Magnus-Stinson noted that 
between the time she issued her earlier 
order dismissing Kluge’s constitutional 
claim and the date of this new decision, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th 
Circuit had issued a ruling accepting a 
similar constitutional claim by a public 
university professor who was disciplined 
by the university’s administration for 
actually misgendering transgender 
students in the classroom, after having 
agreed not to do so by adopting 
the same procedure that Kluge had 
proposed: avoiding using first names 
and pronouns in class. Indiana is in the 
7th Circuit, so the 6th Circuit’s ruling 
was not binding on an Indiana district 
court, and that court premised its ruling 
solely on the 1st Amendment. 
“Interestingly,” noted Judge 
Magnus-Stinson, “the case upon which 
Mr. Kluge so vehemently relies as to 
the objective conflict issue, could fairly 
be read to support the existence of an 
undue hardship” on the Corporation. 
“In describing the relevant facts, the 
Sixth Circuit called the university’s 
suggestion that the professor eliminate 
all gendered language ‘a practical 
impossibility that would also alter 
the pedagogical environment in his 
classroom’ and noted that the professor 
was of the opinion that ‘eliminating 
pronouns altogether was next to 
impossible, especially when teaching.’” 
Press attention to Judge Magnus-
Stinson’s ruling may attract the attention 
of the anti-LGBTQ organizations that 
frequently take cases like this one, 
such as Alliance Defending Freedom 
or Liberty Counsel, which might result 
in an appeal to the 7th Circuit. Judge 
Magnus-Stinson was appointed by 





Patient Bill of 
Rights
By Arthur S. Leonard
A three-judge panel of California’s 
3rd District Court of Appeal partially 
reversed a ruling by Sacramento 
County Superior Court Judge Steven 
M. Gevercer in Taking Offense v. State 
of California, 2021 Cal. App. LEXIS 
583, 2021 WL 3013112 (July 16, 2021), 
holding that the state violated the 1st 
Amendment free speech rights of staff 
members in long-term-care facilities 
by making it a misdemeanor for such 
individuals to repeatedly and knowingly 
misgender a resident of such a facility. 
At the same time, however, the court 
rejected an equal protection challenge 
to a provision that protects transgender 
residents’ rights to be housed consistent 
with their gender identity. Judge Elena 
Duarte wrote the opinion for the 
appellate panel. Judge Gevercer had 
rejected constitutional challenges to 
both provisions.
The misgendering provision is part 
of California’s LGBT Long-Term-Care 
Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights, passed 
in 2017 in response to evidence that 
LGBT people have suffered significant 
discrimination in such facilities. The 
plaintiff in this case, an “unincorporated 
association which includes at least 
one California citizen and taxpayer,” 
calls itself “Taking Offence,” and they 
“take offence” to the state making such 
speech a crime. 
The court decided that the 
misgendering provision is a content-
based regulation of speech by the 
government, which under both the 
state and federal constitutions would be 
presumptively unconstitutional unless 
it met the test of strict scrutiny. Under 
that two-part test, the government 
must have a compelling interest for 
